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FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION AND STATE EXCLUSIVE
REMEDY ISSUES IN EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION
PAUL J. ZECH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Volumes have been written in recent years on the complex and
ever-expanding issue of the pre-emptive effect of various federal statutes
on employment law claims. 1 This article is not intended to be an ex-
haustive or academic analysis of the issue of federal pre-emption, but
rather a practical review of pre-emption and exclusive remedy concepts
that can be of utility to the employment law practitioner, whether on
behalf of plaintiff or defendant. Such a review cannot, of course, take
the place of the deeper working knowledge with the issues that are
inevitably required in a particular case, but may serve to avoid the
immediate error in pleading or the inadvertent omission of a significant
defense.
At the outset, it must be kept in mind that the concepts of pre-
emption and exclusive remedy, while similar in some respects, are still
fundamentally different. As discussed in more detail below, "pre-
emption" applies to the usurpation of a particular field by Congression-
al action. It can apply to defeat both state and federal claims. The term
"exclusive remedy," however, generally applies to a state statutory
scheme which is intended to provide the sole recourse for a particular
claimed injury. Both concepts must be examined by the practitioner in
every employment-related case to determine whether the pleadings will
state a viable cause of action, whether alternative forms of pleading can
cause the petitioner's case to survive a motion to dismiss, and whether
the defendant will have one or more defenses which will ultimately
eliminate all or at least a portion of the plaintiff's case.
* Shareholder, Felhaber, Larson, Fenlon & Vogt, P.A., Minneapolis. Minnesota. J.D., William
Mitchell College of Law (cum laude), 1984. Chairman, Minnesota State Bar Association. Labor &
Employment Law Section, 1993-94. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of
Katherine A. Jones, J.D., University of Minnesota, 1996.
1. See generally Tod A. Cochran, Note, The Golden State of Labor Preemption: The Circuit
Courts Have Gone Too Far, 44 HASTINGS L. REV. 131 (1992); Leta L. Fishman, Note, Preemption
Revisited: Title VII and State Tort Liability After International Union vs. Johnson Controls, 66 ST.
JoHN's L. REV. 1047 (1993); Kevin J. McKeon, Comment, NLRA Pre-emptions Put Simply: Livadas v.
Bradshaw, 33 DuQ. L. RaV. 887 (1995); Eileen Silverstein, Note, Against Pre-Emption and Labor Law,
24 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Edward C. Sweeney, Comment, Dodging the Supremacy Clause: Do State
Successor Statutes Survive Federal Labor Law Pre-emption?, 13 INUs. REL. L.J. 183 (1991).
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II. FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
In its purest form, the concept of pre-emption, particularly federal
pre-emption, relates to the doctrine adopted by the United States Su-
preme Court holding that certain matters are of such a significant,
national character that no state law can be constitutional if it is in conflict
with a federal statute that was intended to occupy the entire field.
The pre-emption doctrine and its various permutations has its roots
in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution which simply
states "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 2
The implications of the Supremacy Clause, particularly as it relates to
enactments by both the federal and state branches of government, have
been the subject of detailed analysis by the Supreme Court for well over
150 years. 3
As the Supreme Court has continued to analyze and sharpen the
concept of federal pre-emption, it is increasingly clear that there is no
single route to the conclusion of whether a claim is pre-empted. Initial-
ly, it is clear that pre-emption may be either express or implied, and "is
compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the
statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." 4
Pre-emption is not, however, implicated by suits which are purely private
in nature. Where litigation is purely between private parties and does not
"touch the rights and duties of the United States," federal law will not
govern.5 To date, the Supreme Court has chosen to limit its pre-emption
analysis to essentially three situations:
1. In the presence of a clear statutory prescription;6
2. A direct conflict between federal and state law;7 and
2. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
3. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 240 (1824) (Johnson, J.. concurring) (finding New York
State navigation laws which conflict with licenses granted by an act of Congress to be "repugnant to
the said Constitution, and void").
4. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,525 (1977).
5. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506 (1987) (citing Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33 (1956)).
6. See, e.g., Jones, 430 U.S. at 525 (noting that where Congress has made it clear that it alone
will regulate, state regulations in that area are prescribed); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (discussing that where Congress intended to exclusively regulate, then state
regulation is prescribed).
7. See, eg., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul. 373 U.S. 132. 142-43 (1963) (holding that
federal law regulating marketing of avocados pre-empts California statute where compliance with
both laws was impossible); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (holding that the Federal Alien
Registration Act pre-empted state alien registration acts).
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3. "Obligations to and rights of the United States under its
contracts."8
In reference to the first category, therefore, absent explicit pre-
emptive language, Congress' intent to supersede state law altogether may
be inferred whenever the federal scheme created by Congress is so
pervasive as to reasonably infer that Congress was usurping the field.9 In
the second category, where state law directly conflicts with the federal
law, the Supreme Court holds that the state law is pre-empted because
compliance with both the federal and state regulations is simply an
impossibility.10 And, in the third category where pre-emption is recog-
nized, the court has expressed concerns over the validity of state action
whenever "uniquely federal interests" are implicated such as the situa-
tion where the imposition of liability on government contractors may
directly affect the terms of a government contract.] I
Pre-emption of a state law is ordinarily found only reluctantly,
however.12 Especially in cases where, like the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), no express pre-emption provision exists, courts will begin
their analysis "with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to
displace state law."1 3
III. SIGNIFICANT FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION ISSUES
Understandably, it was not until after the passage of the Wagner Act
and ensuing employment-related litigation that federal pre-emption
issues in the labor law arena came to be addressed. The National Labor
Relations Act was so far reaching in scope, and the Congressional intent
to occupy the field so evident, that the issue of pre-emption was quickly
before the federal judiciary. As 'discussed below, numerous other acts
directly relating to employment have been the subject of pre-emption
litigation as well.
8. See, e.g., Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504 (stating "that obligations to and rights of the United States
under its contracts are governed exclusively by federal law"); United States v. Little Lake Misere
Land Co.. 412 U.S. 580. 592-94 (1973) (holding that where the United States was a party to a land
transaction, the federal courts should determine the applicable law).
9. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp.. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
10. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142-43.
I1. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507.
12. Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 507 U.S. 218, 224
(1993) (holding the National Labor Relations Act does not pre-empt enforcement by a state authority
acting as the owner of a construction project).
13. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
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A. NLRA PRE-EMPTION
Through passage of the National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter
NLRA]14 in 1935, Congress assumed control over the broad and previ-
ously uncontrolled body of laws which now fall into the rubric of "labor
law." Prior to this enactment, states had established a variety of statutory
and common law schemes designed to address labor relations within
their borders.
In any situation involving employment litigation, there exists the
potential that the aggrieved employee may have rights protected by the
NLRA, whether the employee worked in a unionized setting or not. The
NLRA established a number of federally protected employee rights,
summarized by Section 7 of the Act:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment.... 15
In addressing the pre-emption issues presented by the NLRA, the
Supreme Court has formulated key pre-emption theories. The first,
referred to as Garmon pre-emption was articulated by the court in San
Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon.16 Garmon pre-emption
prohibits state regulation of activities that are protected by Section 7 of
the NLRA or which constitute an unfair labor practice under Section 8.17
Garmon pre-emption also forbids state regulation of activities that the
NLRA arguably protects or prohibits.18 Essentially, the Garmon pre-
emption rule works to prevent conflict between state and local regulation
and the integrated scheme of regulation established by the NLRA.
A second pre-emption principle, referred to as Machinists pre-
emption emanates from Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
15. Id. § 157.
16. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
17. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
18. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus. v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986) (summarizing Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, and stating that "states may not regulate activity that the NLRA protects, prohibits, or
arguably protects or prohibits").
328 [VOL. 72:325
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Commission.19 Under Machinists pre-emption, the focus is on whether
the state has attempted to regulate areas that Congress intended "to be
controlled by the free play of economic forces."20 Under this pre-
emption principle, states are prohibited from attempting to regulate the
economic weapons that are part and parcel of the collective bargaining
process. Both employers and employees are deemed to have the right to
resort to such economic weapons and the state "may not prohibit the use
of such weapons or 'add to an employer's federal legal obligations in
collective bargaining' any more than in the case of employees." 2 1
Typically, NLRA pre-emption occurs when a plaintiff attempts to
seek judicial relief for actions by an employer that arguably constitute or
relate to an unfair labor practice under the Act. For example, as early as
1945, the Supreme Court held that a Florida law which attempted to
place restrictions on who could qualify as a union business agent was
pre-empted by the NLRA. 22 The Court determined that any such restric-
tion unduly interfered with employees' rights under Section 7 of the Act
to select their own representatives.23
In a subsequent Florida decision, the employee had sought unem-
ployment compensation benefits and was deemed disqualified because
she had filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor
Relations Board. 24 In Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission,25 the
Court held that the statute was unconstitutional as a violation of the
supremacy clause, frustrating the enforcement of the NLRA.26
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has gone so far as to hold that
the NLRA pre-empts discrimination claims under certain circumstanc-
es.27 Specifically, in Chaulk Services, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission
Against Discrimination,28 the court found that the Act expressly pre-
empted a claim of discrimination based upon allegations of harassment
concerning union activity despite plaintiff's claim that the harassment
was actually gender-based. 29 Because the plaintiff's claims were funda-
mentally grounded on an assertion that her employer had illegally
19. 427 U.S. 132 (1976). See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A.. 475 U.S. 608. 613
(1989) (involving application of the Machinists pre-emption principle).
20. Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132. 140 (1976) (quoting
NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)).
21. Id. at 147.
22. Hill v. Florida. 325 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1945).
23. Id. at 544 (Stone, J., concurring).
24. Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n. 389 U.S. 235 (1967).
25. 389 U.S. 235 (1967).
26. Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235,239-40 (1967).
27. Chaulk Servs., Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 70 F.3d 1361 (1st Cir.
1995).
28. 70 F.3d 1361 (lst Cir. 1995).
29. Chaulk, 70 F.3d at 1366.
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interfered with her protected union activity, the court held that a broad
interpretation of the NLRA required the finding of pre-emption and
abstention .30
Although an attempt at private enforcement of rights governed by
the NLRA will ordinarily be met with a swift dismissal on pre-emption
grounds, the Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the
pre-emption doctrine. The Garmon Court itself acknowledged that the
pre-emption doctrine will not be applied to activities that concerns
interests "deeply rooted in local feeling." 31 Thus, cases involving
actions such as mass picketing or threats of violence in the labor context
will ordinarily not be deemed pre-empted by the NLRA.32
These exceptions were detailed by the Supreme Court in Linn v.
United Plant Guard Workers of America ,33 where an employer official
sued an employee, a union, and two of the union's officers, alleging that
statements made in an organizing campaign were libelous per se. 34 The
Court exempted such actions from NLRA pre-emption, noting that states
need not yield jurisdiction to the federal government where the activity
being regulated is merely of peripheral concern to the NLRA or other-
wise touches upon local interests so deeply rooted that it cannot be
assumed that Congress intended to deprive states of the power to act.35
B. LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act [hereinafter
LMRA]36 provides as follows:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties. 37
30. Id. at 1370-71.
31. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon. 359 U.S. 236,244 (1959).
32. See generally UAW-CIO v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (reiterating that NLRB does not
have exclusive jurisdiction over common-law tort actions where conduct constitutes an unfair labor
practice).
33. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
34. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 55-56 (1966).
35. See Minor v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 75 N.W.2d 139, 141-42 (N.D. 1956) (in-
volving a state court action to enjoin illegal picketing intended to force union recognition not pre-
empted by the Labor Management Relations Act).




On its face, the statute provides for federal jurisdiction over contro-
versies involving collective bargaining agreements. However, the Su-
preme Court has also concluded that section 301 expresses a Congressio-
nal intent that the federal courts develop a federal common law to be
applied in suits for enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.
38
When a suit stating a claim under section 301 is brought, state contract
law is displaced, and the collective bargaining agreement is interpreted
under this federal common law. 39 The purpose of pre-empting state
contract law with a uniform federal law is simply to allow parties to
collective bargaining agreements to have some certainty as to the way
that the agreement will be construed by the courts. As summarized by
the Supreme Court:
Thus, questions relating to what the parties to a labor agree-
ment agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to
flow from breaches to that agreement, must be resolved by
reference to uniform federal law, whether such questions arise
in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit
alleging liability and tort. Any other result would elevate form
over substance and allow parties to evade the requirements of
[Section] 301 by relabeling their contract claims as claims for
tortious breach of contract. 40
The federal courts analyze this pre-emption question under the
LMRA as requiring pre-emption when resolution of a state law claim of
any nature is "substantially dependent upon" an analysis of the terms
of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract. 41 Howev-
er, the Supreme Court has routinely confirmed that "not every dispute
concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of the
collective bargaining agreement is pre-empted by Section 301."42 In
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,43 the Court held that
section 301 did not pre-empt a state law tort claim for retaliatory dis-
charge, even though the collective bargaining agreement governing the
employment provided for arbitral adjudication of an employee's claim
that she was fired without just cause.44 As long as the state law could be
resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim was consid-
38. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,450-51 (1957).
39. Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flower Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962).
40. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck. 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985) (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 220.
42. Id. at 211.
43. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
44. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,413 (1988).
1996]
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ered to be "independent" of the agreement for purposes of analyzing
section 301 pre-emption. 45
Thus, section 301 pre-empts state law only insofar as resolution of
the state law claim requires the interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement. The mere fact that the state law analysis may require the
state court to focus on the same facts that would control resolution of an
employee's contractual remedy is not enough to require pre-emption of
the state law claim. If adjudication of the state law claim does not
require a court to interpret any term of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, then the state law claim is not pre-empted.
The LMRA's pre-emption impact is powerful, however, reaching as
far as most employment-related tort claims. 46 Thus, claims against an
employer for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress
have been held pre-empted by the LMRA and the employee's failure to
use the grievance procedures laid out in the collective bargaining agree-
ment prevented him from pursuing any claims.47 Similarly, claims for
slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference
with contractual relations, wrongful discharge, libel, and a spouse's claim
for loss of consortium were all held to be pre-empted by the LMRA
except to the extent that libel, malicious prosecution/false arrest, or loss
of consortium claims did not necessitate consideration or interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement. 48
Even an employee's claims of illegal promotion and training
practices and retaliation under a race discrimination theory have been
pre-empted by the LMRA. In Reece v. Houston Lighting & Power
Co.,49 the Fifth Circuit noted that the plaintiff's claims all turned upon
the collective bargaining contract's provisions on promotion, seniority,
and assignment to training programs. In defending against the employ-
ee's race discrimination claim, the court noted that the company would
necessarily refer to the collective bargaining agreement's provisions as
its legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the actions of which the
plaintiff complained. In then responding to those articulated reasons,
the plaintiff would necessarily need to attack them as pretextual, requir-
ing a contractual interpretation. Thus, the employee's state law race
discrimination claims were deemed pre-empted citing the Supreme
Court's Lingle analysis.
45. Id. at 410.
46. See Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that § 301
is so powerful that it displaces entirely any state cause of action whose outcome would depend upon
analysis of the collective bargaining agreement).
47. Bagby v. General Motors Corp., 976 F.2d 919,921 (5th Cir. 1992).
48. Johnson v. Anheuser Busch, 876 F.2d 620,623 (8th Cir. 1989).
49. 79 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 1996).
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The Indiana Court of Appeals recently examined the pre-emption
provisions of the LMRA and held that the Act pre-empted claims of
invasion of privacy and defamation relating to the employer's drug
testing program. 50 Finding that the plaintiff's working conditions were
governed by the collective bargaining agreement between her union and
her employer, her claims were "inextricably intertwined with an analysis
of the collective bargaining agreement" and were pre-empted by the
LMRA.51
C. THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
Similar to NLRA pre-emption is the pre-emption provided by the
Railway Labor Act [hereinafter RLA].52 The RLA applies, inter alia, to
the employer-employee relationship arising in the railroad and airline
industries. Because of the statutory scheme created for resolving dis-
putes in transportation, however, the pre-emptive effect of the RLA is
significantly broader than that of the NLRA or LMRA.
The RLA contemplates two distinct classes of controversy between
employer and employee: major disputes which seek to create contractual
rights, and minor disputes which are intended to enforce them. 53 In the
event of a "major dispute" under the RLA, the Act requires the parties
to undergo a lengthy process of bargaining and mediation, maintaining
the status quo between them until the procedures are exhausted.
In contrast, the minor dispute category sets forth compulsory
arbitration procedures for disputes arising or growing "out of grievanc-
es or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." 54 Essentially, whenever an
employer asserts a contractual right to take a contested action, the
ensuing dispute is automatically deemed minor if the action is at least
arguably justified by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
between the parties. Only if the employer's assertion is frivolous or
obviously insubstantial does the dispute become declared major.55
Under this major/minor dichotomy established in the RLA, virtually
any discharge action by an employer will be deemed minor so as to
require the plaintiff to follow the grievance and arbitration procedures
set forth in the RLA. Thus, where a plaintiff alleged "wrongful dis-
charge" against a railroad for refusing to allow him to return to work
50. Jobes v. Tokheim Corp., 657 N.E.2d 145, 148-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
51. Id. at 148.
52. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
53. Elgin, J. & E.R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711,723 (1945).
54. 45 U.S.C. §§ 152(Sixth), § 153(First).
55. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299. 302-07 (1989).
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following his recovery from an auto accident, his claim was dismissed on
RLA pre-emption issues. 56 The Supreme Court held in that case that the
only source of the plaintiff's right not to be discharged and the only
basis upon which plaintiff could claim that his discharge was "wrong-
ful" was the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and
the union. 57 His claim was therefore deemed subject to the RLA's
requirement that it be submitted to the National Adjustment Board for
adjustment, leaving plaintiff with no judicial relief in state or federal
court.
58
Even state handicap discrimination provisions have been held pre-
empted by the RLA under certain conditions. 59 In O'Brien v. Consoli-
dated Railway Corp.,60 the plaintiff contended that he had been discrimi-
nated against on the basis of his disability by the defendant's denial of a
job opportunity to him. 61 Plaintiff was ultimately dismissed from his
position and then filed a state court action alleging disability discrimina-
tion under the Massachusetts Human Rights Act. 62 The railroad peti-
tioned to remove the case to federal court and then moved for summary
judgment on pre-emption grounds. 63 Distinguishing the RLA's pre-
emption provisions from the case law denying pre-emption of Human
Rights Act claims under the LMRA, the First Circuit concluded that the
collective bargaining agreement needed to be interpreted in order to
establish the legitimacy of the plaintiff's claims and the employer's
defenses.64 Explaining its rationale, the court stated:
More fundamentally, addressing the merits of [plaintiff's]
claim of physical handicap discrimination would require us to
assess [his] fitness and ability to perform safely the functions
of a stevedore. Yet an employee's fitness and ability are
governed by the rules and procedures contained in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.... [The anti-discrimination statute]
requires a court to determine whether the plaintiff is a "quali-
fied handicapped person," but this determination would be
impossible to make without reference to the collective bargain-
ing agreement. 65
56. Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320,321 (1972).
57. Id. at 326.
58. Id. at 324.
59. O'Brien v. Consolidated Ry. Corp., 972 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992).
60. 972 F.2d I (Ist Cir. 1992).
61. O'Brien v. Consolidated Ry. Corp., 972 F.2d 1.2 (1st Cir. 1992).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 4-5.
65. Id. at 5.
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The court went on to distinguish such handicap discrimination
provisions from race discrimination rulings in which it has been deter-
mined that the RLA does not pre-empt state actions for racial discrimina-
tion.66 "Resolution of the question of whether an employer was en-
gaged in racial discrimination could not require interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement." 67
Even when an employee covered by the RLA is appropriately
seeking relief through the Federal Employers Liability Act [FELA], the
employee's claim may wind up being pre-empted by the RLA. For
example, where an injured railway worker brought an action against a
railroad to recover work-related compensatory damages for an on-the-
job injury, his claim that he was discharged in retaliation for filing the
FELA claim became a "minor dispute" that was then pre-empted by the
RLA.68
Although broad in its application, RLA pre-emption is not without
its limits. If the nature of the employee's claim rises to a level of being a
"major dispute" the pre-emptive effect of the RLA will not apply.
Thus, where an employee claimed wrongful discharge based on his
unionizing activity, his claim was deemed not to be a "minor dispute"
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitral board under the RLA and
the employee was entitled to pursue his state court cause of action
against the employer.69
Because the pre-emptive effect of the RLA is so sweeping, counsel
representing an employee who is arguably covered by the Act must
carefully consider not only the pre-emption issues, but also the need for
timely filing for adjustment under the statute. Submission to the Nation-
al Railroad Adjustment Board requires strict adherence to the timing
provisions established by the collective bargaining agreement. Failure to
adhere to the prescribed time limits can result in dismissal with no
judicial recourse.70
Even claims arising from conduct occurring prior to the com-
mencement of any formal employment relationship may be covered by
the pre-emptive force of the RLA. Thus, where a plaintiff's claims were
66. O'Brien, 972 F.2d at 5-6.
67. Id. at 6 (citing Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, 372 U.S. 714,
724 (1963); McCall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 844 F.2d 294, 302 (6th Cir. 1988)). See also Bowe
v. Northwest Airlines, 974 F.2d 101, 103 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that former airline employee seeking
disability benefits under collective bargaining agreement states minor dispute under RLA which must
be pursued through statutory scheme: also, no ERISA pre-emption of mandatory arbitration of such
minor disputes is applicable).
68. Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 717 F.2d 1045, 1049-51 (7th Cir.),cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1007 (1984).
69. Davies v. American Airlines. 971 F.2d 463,468 (10th Cir. 1992).
70. Union Pacific R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 95 (1978).
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premised on misrepresentations made prior to her hire, the RLA still pre-
empted any state court cause of action sounding in tort as her claim
would require an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. 7 1
D. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
In 1974 Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act [hereinafter ERISA],72 a comprehensive statutory scheme
designed to govern health care and other benefits provided by employ-
ers to their employees. That Act included a broad and explicit pre-
emption clause covering any state law claim that "relates to" an ERISA
employee benefit plan.73
Counsel presented with actual or contemplated employment-related
litigation should consider the fact that ERISA pre-emption has been
characterized as among the broadest ever enacted by Congress. 74 ERISA
has been interpreted as intended to pre-empt even generally applicable
laws enacted by a state, not simply laws aimed exclusively at employee
benefit plans. 75
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has succinctly described the
proper analysis to be undertaken in considering ERISA pre-emption:
The key to distinguishing what ERISA pre-empts and what it
does not lies, we believe, in recognizing that the statute compre-
hensively regulates certain relationships: for instance, the
relationship between plan and plan member, between plan and
employer, between employer and employee (to the extent an
employee benefit plan is involved), and between plan and
trustee. Because of ERISA's explicit language, and because
state laws regulating these relationships (or the obligations
flowing from these relationships) are particularly likely to
interfere with ERISA's scheme, these laws are presumptively
pre-empted.76
Despite its broad construction of the pre-emption visions of ERISA,
the United States Supreme Court has recognized that there are limits to
71. Melanson v. United Airlines, 931 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1991). But see Nelson v. Piedmont
Aviation, Inc., 750 F.2d 1234, 1236 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding that an applicant for employment is not an
"employee" under the Railway Labor Act).
72. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144 (1994).
73. Id. § 1144.
74. PM Group Life Ins. Co. v. Western Growers Assurance Trust, 953 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir.
1992).
75. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,47-48 (1987).
76. General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Castonguay, 984 F.2d 1518, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing J.
Daniel Plants, Note, Employer Recapture of ERISA Contributions Made by Mistake, 89 MIcH. L. R EV.
2000,2017 (1991); PM Group Life Ins., 953 F.2d at 545).
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that pre-emption and that ERISA does not necessarily pre-empt either a
generally applicable state statute that "might burden the administration
of a plan" or "that makes no reference to or functions irrespective of,
the existence of an ERISA plan." 77 The Court has also indicated that
certain "state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous,
remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates
to' the plan." 78 Finally, the Court presumes Congress did not intend to
pre-empt areas of traditional state regulation when it enacted ERISA.79
Essentially, courts have condensed the above principles and have
categorized ERISA pre-emption along the following lines:
1. Laws that regulate the types of benefits or terms of ERISA
plans;
2. Laws that require reporting, disclosure, funding, or vesting
requirements for ERISA plans;
3. Laws that provide rules for the calculation of benefits to
be paid under ERISA plans; and
4. Laws that provide remedies for misconduct growing out of
the administration of ERISA plans.8 0
In its application, ERISA can pre-empt even those claims which
appear at first blush to be only indirectly related to ERISA. In Tingey v.
Pixley-Richards West, Inc.,81 the Ninth Circuit was presented with a ten-
count state court common law complaint that had been removed by the
defendant from Arizona State Court to the federal system.8 2 The counts
asserted "garden variety" employment claims, including breach of
contract, breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious
breach, intentional infliction of emotional distress, insurance bad faith,
violation of Arizona statutes pertaining to insurance, intentional interfer-
ence with contract, and denial of prospective benefits. 83 Guided by the
Supreme Court decision in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,8 4 the
Tingey court held that "ERISA's powerful preemption transformed all
77. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990).
78. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 (1983).
79. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724.740 (1985).
80. McLean v. Carlson Cos., 777 F. Supp. 1480, 1483 (D. Minn. 1991) (citing Felton v. Unisource
Corp., 739 F. Supp. 1388, 1390 (D. Ariz. 1990), a'd and rev'din part, 940 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1991)).
81. 953 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1992).
82. Tingey v. Pixley-Richard West, Inc., 953 F.2d 1124, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 1992). The "well-
pleaded complaint rule," which ordinarily prevents a defendant from removing a state court action to
federal court unless the complaint raises a federal question on its face, does not apply to complaints
where the substance of the claims simply "relate" to an ERISA plan. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987).
83. Tingey, 953 F.2d at 1128-29.
84. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
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ten of the Tingeys' claims into federal claims .... The Tingeys' sole
remedy exists in federal court under ERISA."85
A similarly stern result was reached in Sanson v. General Motors
Corp.86 There, the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint was that he had
been defrauded into taking early retirement by the knowing misrepre-
sentations of his employer. 87 Plaintiff claimed that his action was solely
one for common law fraud and that his dispute did not truly "relate to"
the employer's pension plan, but rather to the employer's misrepresenta-
tions .88
The Eleventh Circuit rejected plaintiff's theory, holding that the
misrepresentation plaintiff relied upon related to retirement benefits
available, and that the measure of damages would be the amount of
benefits plaintiff would have received under the retirement plan.89
"Such a determination of damages demonstrates the relationship be-
tween the lawsuit and the special retirement plan." 90 Plaintiff's claims,
therefore, were pre-empted by ERISA and barred. 91 Even non-tradition-
al ERISA plans can result in, ERISA pre-emption. In Moeller v.
Bertrang,92 an employee brought an action against his former employer
seeking to recover retirement benefits based solely on the employer's
oral promise to his employees that such benefits would be payable.
93
There, the federal court stated that the highly specific nature of the
promises the employer had made to the employee, in conjunction with
non-gratuitous payments to another employee under similar circum-
stances was sufficient to constitute a "plan" under ERISA.94 Thus, the
employee's common law contract claim seeking retirement benefits was
deemed to be pre-empted by ERISA.95
A state's "whistleblower" statute can be found to be pre-empted
under ERISA when the nature of the whistleblowing "relates to" an
employee benefit plan. Thus, where an individual employee's whistle-
blowing claim refers to an ERISA plan and, in fact, depends on its very
85. Tingey, 953 F.2d at 1131.
86. 966 F.2d 618 (1l th Cir. 1992).
87. Sanson v. General Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618.619 (11 th Cir. 1992).
88. Id. at 620.
89. Id. at 621.
90. Id.
91. Id. See also Kelso v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 388, 391 (10th Cir. 1992)
(determining that misrepresentation claims regarding eligibility for insurance coverage are pre-
empted under ERISA).
92. 801 F. Supp. 291 (D.S.D. 1992).
93. Moeller v. Bertrang, 801 F. Supp. 291,292-93 (D.S.D. 1992).
94. Id. at 296.
95. Id. at 298.
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existence, the whistleblowing claim and the state statute under which it is
pled is deemed pre-empted by ERISA.96
State anti-discrimination laws, however, are generally not deemed to
be pre-empted by ERISA.97 Although ERISA does not completely pre-
empt a state human rights act provision on employment discrimination,
if a plaintiff contends that the motivating factor behind a termination was
the employer's attempt to avoid benefit payments, pre-emption is clear,
irrespective of the statute under which plaintiff may be attempting to
proceed.98 Thus, where an employee attempts to characterize a claim as
disability discrimination when in fact the allegation is actually one for
termination motivated by a desire to avoid paying long-term disability
benefits, the claim asserted is actually based on the existence of a benefit
plan and is pre-empted by ERISA.99
In summary, virtually any employment-related claim, whether based
on statute or state common law, that relates to, refers to, or appears to
depend upon an alleged ERISA plan must be carefully scrutinized for
the potential pre-emptive effect of ERISA.
E. MISCELLANEOUS FEDERAL STATUTES
In addition to the broader and better established statutory pre-
emption theories outlined above, there are also numerous other federal
statutes and regulatory schemes which, from time to time, have been
alleged to provide a pre-emption defense to defendants against state
causes of action in the employment law context. Generally speaking,
such pre-emption claims have failed but some narrow exceptions to that
general rule do exist.
1. Fair Labor Standards Act
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [hereinafter FLSA]l00 was
passed by Congress to establish a baseline for minimum compensationl01
and required the payment of additional compensation for overtime work
in most industries.102 While the FLSA does not contain the kind of
specific pre-emption language in other federal statutes, there remain
96. McLean v. Carlson Cos., 777 F. Supp. 1480. 1483 (D. Minn. 1991).
97. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 396, 400-401 (Minn. 1979) (deter-
mining that provision of Minnesota Human Rights Act prohibiting discrimination in employment on
basis of sex, including discrimination on the basis of pregnancy-related disabilities, is not pre-empted
by ERISA, following majority rule).
98. Alwin v. Sprint Communications Co.. 870 F. Supp. 275,277 (D. Minn. 1994).
99. Id.
100. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
101. Id. § 206.
102. Id. § 207.
19961
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
circumstances where it can pre-empt certain state court causes of action.
In the context of a "wrongful discharge" claim brought under the
public policy theory, for example, the FLSA pre-emption issue has been
held to be viable.103 In Tate v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co.,
104
the plaintiff claimed to have been discharged for refusing to work
overtime without pay.105 He alleged that discharging him for that reason
violated the public policy embodied by the FLSA, and asserted a wrong-
ful discharge tort claim against his former employer.106 His state court
public policy discharge claim was deemed pre-empted and the case was
dismissed on the basis that the FLSA provided its own enforcement
remedies which plaintiff had not followed. 1 07 The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed dismissal. 08
2. Bankruptcy Code
The Federal Bankruptcy Codel 09 prohibits termination of employ-
ment because an employee has filed for bankruptcy. 110 In contrast to
the pre-emption conclusions reached under similar language in other
statutes, this provision of the Code has been held not to pre-empt a state
court common law action for wrongful termination.111 In Wenners v.
Great State Beverages,112 the court held that "[w]hile a plaintiff may not
pursue a common law remedy where the legislature intended to replace it
with a statutory cause of action, here, there has been no clear statutory
intent to supplant the common law cause of action."1 13 Specifically, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court noted that the Bankruptcy Code itself
provides no actual remedy for violation by a private employer, "nor
does it set forth [any] procedures or refer to any other section of the
Code. '' 114 Therefore, the court held that it could not be determined that
103. Tate v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) $ 33,951 (E.D.
Wis. 1983).
104. 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) T 33,951 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
105. Tate v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 5 33,951 (E.D. Wis.
1983).
106. Id.
107. Id. See generally Michael D. Moberly, Fair Labor Standards Act Preemption of "Public
Policy" Wrongful Discharge Claims, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 525 (1993) (discussing whether FLSA pre-
empts common-law wrongful discharge claim), Michael D. Moberly, Fair Labor Standards Act
Preemption of State Wage Payment Remedies, 23 ARiz. ST. L. 991 (1991) (discussing whether FLSA
pre-empts state statutory remedy for employee due to an employer's failure to pay wages).
108. 742 F.2d 1459 (7th Cir. 1984).
109. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.) 2549.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) (1994).
111. Wenners v. Great State Beverages, 663 A.2d 623,626 (N.H. 1995).
112. 663 A.2d 623 (N.H. 1995).
113. Wenners v. Great State Beverages, 663 A.2d 623, 625 (N.H. 1995).
114. Id. (citations omitted).
[VOL. 72:325340
19961 EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION 341
Congress intended to usurp the field and supplant any common law
causes of action for wrongful termination that may have existed. 1 15
3. Energy Reorganization Act
Various lesser established statutes pertaining to government-related
industries continue to raise questions of potential federal pre-emption.
Such pre-emption was raised as a defense in English v. General Electric
Co.,116 but was ultimately rejected by the court. 117 There, the employee
was a laboratory technician at a nuclear facility operated by General
Electric.118 Plaintiff contended that she had complained about nuclear
safety standards and was ultimately discharged. 1l9 Plaintiff filed a
complaint with the Secretary of Labor regarding the Energy Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1974,120 which made it unlawful for an employer in the
nuclear industry to discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate
against such employee because of complaints pertaining to the indus-
try. 121 Employees subsequently filed suit against General Electric
seeking compensatory and punitive damages under a state law theory of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 122
The Supreme Court analyzed the question as to whether plaintiff's
claims were barred by federal pre-emption under the Energy Reorgani-
zation Act and determined that they were not. 123 Plaintiff's claims were
deemed not to conflict with particular aspects of the Actl 24 and there
were insufficient indicators of Congressional intent upon which to rest a
pre-emption finding.125
4. Atomic Energy Act
In a case of public note, a similar pre-emption analysis was required
in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.126 Again, the question of federal pre-
emption of state claims against an employer under the Atomic Energy
115. Id.
116. 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990).
117. English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990).
118. Id. at 74.
119. Id.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a) (1994).
121. English, 496 U.S. at 75-76.
122. Id. at 77.
123. Id. at 78-90.
124. Id. at 90.
125. Id. at 86. See also Masters v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 917 F.2d 455,456 (10th Cir. 1990).
126. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
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Act of 1954127 were rejected.1 28 In reviewing the statute and analyzing
its potential pre-emptive effect, the Supreme Court held that the Atomic
Energy Act was devoid of "adequate remedy" to those injured by
exposure to hazardous materials.1 29 Accordingly, there were insufficient
grounds for determining such state claims to be pre-empted.130
F. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, practitioners on both sides of employment cases must
contemplate the possibility of federal pre-emption of some or all theo-
ries in such cases. The nature of the claims and the industry in which the
employee works must both be carefully analyzed to assess whether some
federal legislative scheme may provide a pre-emptive right to the em-
ployee, thereby barring a state cause of action.
IV. STATE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
Separate and apart from the issue of federal pre-emption is the
matter of exclusive remedy claims preclusion. State legislatures have
increasingly passed employment-related statutes that not only provide
rights and remedies for employees, but sometimes remove rights and
remedies as well. Workers' compensation statutes and employment
discrimination legislation have both proved to be particularly important
areas of development in recent judicial decisions.
B. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Perhaps the most commonly asserted statutory basis for a defense
that a plaintiff's cause of action is barred by an exclusive remedy
provision is workers' compensation. As a quid pro quo for the passage
of these statutes providing strict liability for work-related injuries, the
various state legislatures most often included a provision making the
workers' compensation statutory scheme an employee's sole remedy for
such injuries.131 Recent developments regarding workers' compensation
127. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2160 (1994).
128. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255-56 (1984).
129. Id. at 256-258.
130. Id. at 256.
131. See, e.g.. N.D. CFNT.CoDa §§ 65-01-01,65-05-06 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-8-6
(1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.031 (West 1994).
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exclusivity in the burgeoning area of employment-related litigation have
significantly broadened the potential defense.
The impact and scope of the exclusive remedy provisions of the
workers' compensation statutes were never more dramatically presented
than in the Minnesota Supreme Court's recent decision in McGowan v.
Our Savior's Lutheran Church.132 There, the plaintiff was a church
employee who was raped while working as the director of a homeless
shelter the church operated.133 Prior to initiating a lawsuit against her
employer, the plaintiff applied for, received and accepted workers'
compensation benefits for the physical injuries she sustained as a result
of being raped.134 She then commenced suit against the church, assert-
ing a claim for negligence.1 35 The church moved for summary judg-
ment on the merits and on jurisdictional grounds, claiming that the
Minnesota Workers' Compensation exclusive remedy provision provided
the plaintiff's exclusive remedy and that state district courts had no
jurisdiction over the dispute.136 Plaintiff, on the other hand, contended
that the Act's "assault exception"1 37 removed her claims from the
exclusive remedy provisions of the statute because her injuries were not,
by definition, a "personal injury."138 Plaintiff contended that she was
assaulted for personal reasons, permitting the application of the assault
exception.139
Rejecting the plaintiff's theory, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff's injuries resulted solely from her activities as an
employee and
that [her] employment was a causal factor contributing to her
being raped. At the time she was raped, [plaintiff] was the
shelter's director and had never had any contact with her
assailant outside the workplace. Further, the assault occurred
during working hours, in her office, while she was directly
engaged in the performance of her work duties. Based on
these facts, we cannot say that the rape arose from circumstanc-
es unrelated to [plaintiff's] employment.140
132. 527 N.W.2d 830 (Minn. 1995).
133. McGowan v. Our Savior's Lutheran Church, 527 N.W.2d 830. 831-32 (Minn. 1995).
134. Id. at 831 n.l.
135. Id. at 831.
136. Id.
137. Id. The Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act excludes from its provisions injuries
"caused by the act of a third person or fellow employee intended to injure the employee because of
personal reasons, and not directed against the employee as an employee, or because of the
employment." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.011(16) (West Supp. 1996).
138. McGowan, 527 N.W.2d at 831 & n.2.
139. Id. at 831.
140. Id. at 834.
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One formula for analyzing compensation cases arising from such
personal assaults is referred to, in Minnesota at least, as the "three
group" method articulated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Hansen
v. Robitshek-Schneider Co.141 There, the supreme court identified three
groups of compensation cases arising from assault: (1) non-compensable
cases in which the assailant is motivated by personal animosity toward
the victims; (2) compensable cases in which the provocation or motiva-
tion arises solely from work activities; and (3) cases that are usually
compensable in which the assault is neither personal nor related to the
employment.142 This method has been used in numerous Minnesota
cases, resulting in mixed conclusions as to compensability and exclusive
remedy application.143
In North Dakota, although not heavily litigated, the state's workers'
compensation exclusive remedy provision has been deemed to apply
even to a spouse's claim for loss of consortium relating to her husband's
work-related injury. In Wald v. City of Grafton ,144 the plaintiff brought
a direct claim against her deceased husband's employer claiming loss of
consortium following his serious injury in an accident while he was
working as an employee of the city.145 The spouse had applied for and
received workers' compensation benefits.146 "The sole issue on appeal
was whether the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensa-
tion statute in North Dakota would serve to bar the plaintiff's cause of
action for loss of consortium."147 Holding that the North Dakota
statutory provision was sufficiently broad to encompass both workers
and their families and dependents, the court concluded that there was no
basis for deviating from the strong policy considerations behind the
exclusive remedy provisions of the Act and denied recovery.148
A statutory workers' compensation exclusive remedy provision can
operate to bar not only common law causes of action in employment
litigation, such as some work-related assaults, but can even serve to
"trump" other statutory schemes intended to protect employee rights.
141. 297 N.W. 19, 21-22 (Minn. 1941).
142. Hansen v. Robitshek-Scheider Co., 297 N.W. 19, 22 (Minn. 1941).
143. See Foley v. Honeywell, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 268, 273 (Minn. 1992) (finding assault exception
inapplicable and concluding that random sexual attack on employee is, as a matter of law, not intended
to injure the employee for personal reasons); Bear v. Honeywell, Inc.. 468 N.W.2d 546, 547-48
(Minn. 1991) (applying the "three group" test to hold that the plaintiff's assault was in category three
and, thus, covered by the Act and that plaintiff could not bring any separate claim against her
employer as a result).
144. 442 N.W.2d 910 (N.D. 1989).
145. Wald v. City of Grafton, 442 N.W.2d 910,910-11 (N.D. 1989).
146. Id. at 910.
147. Id. at 911.
148. Id. at 912.
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In Karst v. F.C. Hayer Co., 149 the issue presented to the Minnesota
Supreme Court was whether the exclusive remedy provision of the
Workers' Compensation Act precluded a discrimination action brought
by a disabled worker against his former employer under the Minnesota
Human Rights Act. 150 The plaintiff had become disabled as a result of
work-related injuries and when his former employer refused to rehire
him, he claimed that it was discrimination due to his disability. The
supreme court posed the issue presented as whether "the Minnesota
Workers' Compensation Act provides a remedy for disability discrimina-
tion."151 The Court ultimately determined that the injury sustained by
the plaintiff as the result of his former employer's refusal to rehire him
was an injury for which compensation was available under the Workers'
Compensation Act. That is, the Workers' Compensation Act provided
the plaintiff with additional benefits due to the company's refusal to
rehire him. Thus, the plaintiff was not entitled to proceed separately
against the employer for disability discrimination. 152
In summary, whenever a plaintiff brings suit against an employer
seeking a remedy for injuries (whether physical or mental in nature)
serious consideration must be given to the Workers' Compensation Act
exclusive remedy provision. Even in cases where the workers' compen-
sation system seemingly should not apply, the affirmative defense can be
raised. Moreover, the exclusive remedy defense raises the fundamental
question of the district court's jurisdiction even to hear such a dispute.
Thus, a denial of a motion to dismiss on exclusive remedy grounds may
be immediately appealable.1 53
C. HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
Like workers' compensation statutes, the anti-discrimination acts
passed by state legislatures also frequently contain express or implied
exclusive remedy provisions. Depending upon such clauses and the
common law claims being pursued, the Human Rights Act can either
preclude such a common law action or at least limit it.
For example, in Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp.,154 the Minnesota
Supreme Court was confronted with the question as to whether a com-
mon law claim for battery could be brought as a parallel action to lay
149. 447 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1989).
150. Karst v. F.C. Hayer Co.,447 N.W.2d 180, 181 (Minn. 1989).
151. Id. at 184.
152. See also Schachter v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 422 N.W.2d 906, 909-910
(Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that workers' compensation law precluded a handicap discrimination act
based upon the same claimed injury).
153. See McGowan v. Our Savior's Lutheran Church, 527 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Minn. 1995).
154. 461 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1990).
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claim for sexual harassment under the Human Rights Act, when the
battery was the same act leading to the unlawful touching under the
sexual harassment claim. 155 The Court emphasized that a Minnesota
Human Rights act required a broad construction to effectuate its purpos-
es. 156 In the absence of an express abrogation in the Human Rights Act
of a common law claim for battery, it was determined that parallel
actions for battery and sexual harassment under the Human Rights Act
could be maintained.
Nevertheless, the Court did not uphold any claim for double recov-
ery for the same harm. "What we have here are two legal remedies for
the same wrongful conduct. Much like a products liability case where
plaintiff pursues both a warranty and a negligence action, here plaintiff
may pursue either or both sexual harassment or battery, provided,
however, there is no double recovery."1 57
At least in Minnesota, then, a plaintiff pursuing such parallel actions
will at some point in the proceedings be required to select a remedy,
although there appears to be no mandate that such selection occur prior
to a verdict.
Since the North Dakota Human Rights Act contains no express
abrogation of any common law cause of action for battery, the same
analysis could be applied should a plaintiff seek to bring parallel causes
of action for battery and sexual harassment under the Human Rights
Act.
Still to be refined is the issue of whether a separate tort or statutory
basis exists for an employee who claims to have been the victim of
retaliation for asserting a Human Rights Act claim. Like most state laws
prohibiting employment discrimination, the North Dakota Human Rights
Act makes it a discriminatory practice to "threaten or engage in repri-
sal" against a person who has asserted rights under the Act.158 Similar
language in Minnesota's Human Rights Act has led at least one district
court to conclude that this statutory provision prohibits an employee
from pursuing a parallel state action for whistleblowing under Minnesota
Whistleblower Statute.159
In Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center, Inc., 160 the plaintiff
alleged that her employer retaliated against her for complaining about
sexual harassment and that this retaliation gave rise to claims under the
155. Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374,379 (Minn. 1990).
156. Id. at 378.
157. Id. at 379.
158. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-18 (1995).
159. Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Ctr., 530 N.W.2d 852, 857 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
(concluding that the dismissal of the whistleblower claim by the district court was in error).
160. 530 N.W.2d 852 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
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reprisal provisions of the Minnesota Human Rights Actl61 and Minnesota
Whistleblower's Statute. 162 The district court held that plaintiff's claims
for the alleged reprisal were limited to the Human Rights Act, noting that
statute's exclusive remedy language: "The procedure herein provided
shall, while pending, be exclusive."i 63 The court of appeals, however,
disagreed.1 64 Concluding that the Minnesota Human Rights Act and
Whistleblower Statutes needed to be harmonized if at all possible, the
court found that the Whistleblower Statute's remedies were "in addition
to any remedies otherwise provided by law" and that both statutory
claims could be pursued simultaneously.165
In contrast to the issues presented in Williams, the North Dakota
Whistleblower Statute is less detailed than Minnesota's, contains no
specific remedies provision, and does not appear to provide a private
cause of action. 166 Furthermore, the North Dakota Human Rights Act
does not contain the exclusivity language presented in the Minnesota
Human Rights Act. 167 Thus, only through judicial proceedings will it
become clear whether simultaneous reprisal actions can be maintained
under North Dakota law, or whether the Human Rights Act will serve as a
plaintiff's sole remedy.
V. CONCLUSION
As legislatures continue to pass and refine employment rights
legislation, more attention needs to be paid to the issues of pre-emption
and exclusive remedy. When Congress passes sweeping new legislation
(such as the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Family and Medical
Leave Act) lawmakers should more clearly express their intent as to
issues that pertain to pre-emption and whether Congress is intending to
occupy the entire field. At the state level, legislation that provides new
rights and remedies or which codifies existing common law rights should
be crafted to address potential conflicts with other employment statutes
and claims. Significant rights and defenses relating to employment
should not be left to succeed or fail based on needless judicial harmoniz-
ing of statutes which could have been avoided merely by proper drafting
and review of the policy considerations behind the legislation.
161. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(7) (West 1995).
162. d. § 181.932-937.
163. Id. § 363.11; Williams, 530 N.W.2d at 855.
164. Williams, 530 N.W.2d at 855-56.
165. Id. at 856-57.
166. N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06-18 (1987).
167. Cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.11 (stating that the procedures provided in the section are
exclusive while pending).
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